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Framing Non-Whites and Producing Second-Class Citizens
in France and Portugal
Bernd Reiter
The quality of contemporary democracies hinges on the breadth and depth of the
citizenship regimes on which democracy ultimately rests. This article argues that,
to assess citizenship, two important dimensions are of crucial interest, namely to
what extent formal citizens are able to live and practice substantive citizenship
roles and, secondly, how access to citizenship rights is used by different societal
groups in order to defend privilege. Having conducted a comparative case study
of Portugal and France, I now argue that political elites are contributing to a
framing of non-whites as foreigners and immigrants because it serves their
purpose and that of the majority of their electorate. I also demonstrate how
academia contributes to this framing, as many scholars seem unable to free
themselves from biased academic traditions, some of which are clearly racist.
Keywords: Portugal; France; Citizenship; Racism; Minorities

Introduction: Second-Class Citizenship
Civilization has not yet fully recovered from the shock of its birth—the transition from the
tribal or ‘closed society’ with its submission to magical forces, to the ‘open society’, which
sets free the critical powers of man. […] the shock of this transition is one of the factors that
have made possible the rise of those reactionary movements, which have tried, and still try,
to overthrow civilization and return to tribalism (Karl Popper 1962)

In recent years, the discourse about democracy has shifted from a focus on
transition, to consolidation, and lately on the quality of democracy (O’Donnell
et.al. 2004). Most authors follow the path-breaking work of T.H. Marshall (1992
[1950]) and focus on citizenship rights as a way to assess democratic quality
(e.g. Hagopian 2007). Others, more specific, argue that we need to take a close
look at civil rights in order to determine the quality of democracy (Fischer 2008;
Holston 2008). This focus on civil rights has significantly added to our
understanding of what is wrong with democracies deemed to be ‘wanting’ or
‘missing something’. However, the almost exclusive focus on rights has led our
view away from the original meaning of citizenship, composed not just of rights,
but also of responsibilities. In addition, this discourse on rights has furthered an
understanding that, as citizens, we are entitled to a set of rights and has led
many to discuss how far these rights should stretch—for example, whether or not
they should include social and cultural rights (Young 1990).
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I argue that an exclusive focus on citizenship as a set of rights is misguided and
analytically not helpful. I agree with Dworkin (1978), who argues that the only
right we have is that of equal treatment. Citizenship consists of rights and
responsibilities, where rights are not entitlements, but certain collectively
enforced protections and guarantees. Furthermore, citizenship consists of duties
towards the collective which, in a democratic regime, translates into
responsibilities towards the rules and contents of democracy. Accepting this
broader definition of citizenship allows us to better assess the quality of
democracy by analysing the quality of its citizenship—in terms both of rights and
of responsibilities.
By broadening the focus towards rights and responsibilities, we are able to
compare a broader spectrum of democracies along a greater scale of indicators.
Although some more-consolidated democracies have been able to guarantee a
broad set of rights to their citizens, they score low when it comes to citizen
responsibilities. Others, typically of the less-developed world, have been unable
to guarantee rights, but they demand—and can sometimes count on—high
degrees of citizen action and participation, which significantly adds to an active
citizenship and thus to citizenship responsibility (Avritzer 2009).
Typical scenarios also include a separation, among the citizenry, between
those who have rights and those who have responsibilities. Some privileged
groups have been able to secure rights without sharing in the responsibilities;
other groups have been left with responsibilities, without having access to the
same rights (most notoriously in the case of women, non-traditional citizens and
minorities). The distinction of who has rights and who does not—as well as the
related differentiation between those on whose responsibilities the state relies,
and those who avoid these responsibilities—is highly consequential. Citizenship
status, ethnicity, class and gender, have been used to divide citizenry into those
with and those without rights, and those with and those without responsibilities.
Substantive Citizenship as a Social Role and Relational Asset
In his seminal work entitled Citizenship and Social Class, Marshall
(1992[1950]) argued that, in Europe, civil rights preceded political rights and
that, once both these rights were achieved, social rights would follow.
Marshall predicted that the twentieth century would see an expansion of
social rights which he defined as ‘the whole range from the right to a
modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in
the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the
standards prevailing in society. The institutions most closely connected with
it are the educational system and the social services’ (Marshall 1992[1950]:
8). For him, the state was called upon to reduce the risks associated with
capitalism for the poorest citizens, state action which would lead to an
‘overarching sense of community and civilization’ (Jones and Gaventa 2002:
3).
When the twentieth century came to an end, it became clear that
Marshall’s prediction was too optimistic. In 2009, many European citizens
are effectively still excluded from social rights, to the point where some
analysts argue that Europe is developing an apartheid system (Balibar
2004). Non-traditional, non-white European citizens, in particular, see their
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civil rights curbed by the forces of prejudice and racism. In many countries
they are treated as foreigners and intruders despite their legal citizenship
(Rosello 2001). Instead of social rights following civil and political rights, it
rather appears that the exercise of civil rights depends on the previous
achievement of social rights, as racism is undermining the effectiveness of
civil and political rights of all those stigmatised as ‘Others Within’.
Racism is at the core of this exclusion and it is Marshall’s underestimation
of the power of racism that led him to formulate overly optimistic predictions
about Europe’s democratic future. In Europe, as elsewhere, racism
continues to be functional for the maintenance and reproduction of privilege.
Worse, with the increased market competition characteristic of advanced
capitalist systems, the importance of racism might grow. Racism becomes
more pronounced when different actors compete for scarce, and thus highly
desirable, goods (Winant 2001). Under such conditions, whiteness functions
as an additional capital, bestowing competitive advantages on those able to
claim it with success (Reiter 2009).
Citizenship is a broad concept. According to Webster’s definition, it is ‘the
status of being a citizen’. Marshall (1992[1950]: 18), in turn, defines citizenship as
‘a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who
possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which
the status is endowed’. Tom Bottomore, who wrote the essay ‘Forty Years
On’ which, together with Marshall’s own essay, comprises the publication
through which Marshall’s work is accessible (1992), already points out that
citizenship ‘in our days’ (his were the days of the 1990s) faces new
challenges, some of which Marshall could not have foreseen. Among others,
he mentions the problems triggered by increased migration, which thus
cause greater ethnic heterogeneity among European citizenry and pose new
challenges to citizenship. To capture these new challenges, Bottomore
proposes a distinction between formal and substantive citizenship—a
distinction introduced by Brubaker (1989, 1992). He quotes Brubaker, who
had argued that ‘Formal citizenship is neither a sufficient, nor a necessary
condition for substantive citizenship’ (Brubaker, quoted in Bottomore 1992: 66).
Several authors have disputed the notion of citizenship as a status. For
communitarians such as Sandel (1998), citizenship, more than a right, is an
obligation and a calling to participate and actively engage in one’s
community. Civic republicans such as Habermas (1998) have stressed that
what makes one a citizen is the ability to participate in collective decisionmaking and thus to fulfill one’s role as an active constituent of popular
sovereignty. According to Jones and Gaventa, ‘At the centre of much
contemporary writing is the need to conceptualize citizenship as both a
status, which accords a range of rights and obligations and an active
practice’ (2002: 5). Since then, others have tried to expand the notion of
citizenship and have proposed alternative ways of conceptualisation.
Somers, for example, has defined citizenship as ‘a set of institutionally
embedded social practices’ (1993: 589). More-recent treatments of
citizenship—e.g. those collected in Tulchin and Ruthenberg (2007)—follow
this focus on citizenship as a practice. Holston proposes ‘to study the full
experience of citizenship, and not only its political aspect’ (2007). In his book
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Insurgent Democracy, Holston (2008) indeed applies an anthropological
framework to the analysis of how citizenship is experienced in everyday life.
However, these recent efforts to adequately capture and explain what
citizenship effectively is and what it means to different people have not yet
produced a conclusive framework and Hagopian’s (2007) call to focus on
citizenship, especially when studying such ‘disjunctive democracies’ (Holston
2008), where political and civil rights do not necessarily go hand-in-hand, still
stands.
To define citizenship, we therefore first need a useful analytical framework—a
lens that allows us to focus on and delineate what the word ‘citizenship’ stands
for. I propose to accept Brubaker’s distinction of formal and substantive
citizenship and, in this article, further elaborate on the meaning of
substantive citizenship. What exactly is substantive citizenship and how can
we, as social researchers, assess it? Substantive citizenship, I propose, has
two important dimensions: as a social role and as a relational asset.
Indicating the relative presence or absence, as well as the quality of
possession, on both dimensions allows us to gain a deeper, more specific,
more precise and hence more accurate and valid, capturing of the empirical
reality represented by the concept of citizenship.
Hence, I propose that the concept of citizenship and the rights associated
with it have two important dimensions as yet unexplored, or rather, not yet
applied systematically to the study of democracy. First, citizenship is not just
a legal status; it needs to be a practical and practiced reality for it to have
any impact on people’s lives. As such, citizenship is associated with the role
of being a citizen invested with certain rights and duties and protected by the
state that makes and enforces the rules and laws that define citizenship.
Citizenship, then, is best understood as a social role, as Brazilian
anthropologist da Matta (1987) has long pointed out, and Holston (2008) has
more recently highlighted again. If some citizens are not treated as citizens,
citizenship remains an empty concept. Second, citizenship is also an asset
and, just like any other asset, it is disputed. As an asset, the value of
substantive citizenship is relational, i.e. its value is derived from how much
substantive citizenship one person or group has, compared to another
person or group. Having access to the asset of citizenship when most people
do not, bestows extra value onto its possession. 1 Treating citizenship as a
relational asset implies that its unequal distribution divides the citizenry, and
privileges those able to claim more citizenship than others and, through this
process, secure tangible advantages for themselves.
Seen in this light, the widely used concept of exclusion gains a more
precise meaning— exclusion from having full access to citizenship rights and
being able to fully live the role of a citizen. This exclusion, then, is mirrored
by the inclusion of all those who are able to claim citizenship roles for
themselves, using this access as a tool to defend privilege and perceiving
the roles as entitlements.
France: Double Standards
In France, republican traditions of universal rights and liberties have dominated
official political discourse since the French revolution. After the breakout of

B. Reiter

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies

minority youth riots in early November 2005, Prime Minister Villepin asserted that
‘France is not a country like others. It will never accept that citizens live
separately, with different opportunities and with unequal futures’.2 The way the
French state seeks to ensure equal opportunities is guided by its commitment to
the republican ideas of citoyenneté and intégration, which point to assimilation as
the only way to integrate immigrants and non-traditional citizens into the nation.
The core of this philosophy is to not recognise differences among French citizens
and to apply colour-blind public policies to ensure equal opportunity.
However, the assertion of the French Prime Minister is in stark contrast to a
French reality that has been depicted by many as increasingly separate,
where people of different ethnic backgrounds encounter very different
opportunities and face highly disparate futures (Balibar 2004). France has
become a showcase and example for a more-dominant European policy of
not recognising ethnic groups and minorities and focusing on assimilation as
the main, and indeed only, way to integrate immigrants. Officially, once a
citizen, the French state does not take account of any group-specific
characteristics that de facto set the citizenry apart, such as ethnicity, religion
or gender. The French state therefore insists on a form of radical
individualism that is anchored in political liberalism and classical
republicanism. This model is dominant all over continental Europe and the
importance of understanding the French way of officially denying the very
existence of minorities therefore extrapolates the borders of the Fifth
Republic.
In real life, the distinction of insider/outsider that regulates national
belonging and the distribution of rights is negotiated through the construction
of a racialised conception of community. Nationalist political groups
rediscover and disseminate a myth of ‘purity’, detecting ‘foreign’ elements
that ‘contaminate’ the national body. Thus, whereas French political elites
insist on not officially recognising any minorities within the national body,
cultural, ethnic and religious differences are routinely recognised in everyday
interactions and are extremely consequential. In a survey conducted in 2007
by SOFRES—‘the most renowned and largest market-research firm in
France’ (Tin 2008: 36)—a total of 3.86 per cent of adults interviewed selfdeclared as ‘black’. Of those, 56 per cent declared that they had
experienced racism in their everyday lives. 3 Research has further
demonstrated that young blacks (classified in the surveys as secondgeneration Maghrebins and sub-Saharan Africans) are 2.5 times more likely
to be unemployed than their white counterparts, which means that their
unemployment rate hovers at around 20 per cent. Although non-whites also
drop out of school more often than whites, their difficulty in finding jobs
remains, even when compared to whites with the same qualifications
(Silberman et al. 2007).
The racist and exclusionary practices responsible for this situation are not
hard to decipher as anxious responses of traditional, white residents towards
a changing environment. As noted above, white French benefit from the
exclusion of non-whites, especially on the job market, where high
unemployment also affects them. Given the evidence of discrimination and
unequal treatment affecting French citizenry depending on their skin colour
and religion, how can we explain that the French state insists on not
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providing statistics that capture these inequalities? Established practices
around the job market provide a first clue: it is common practice in France,
as elsewhere in Europe, for curricula vitae to contain information about the
age of the applicant, as well as a photo. The black French citizens I
interviewed in 2007 had all experienced similar situations when applying for
a job—their candidacy advanced up to the moment when it became obvious
that they were black.
The statement of one black female interviewee—age 28, holder of a
university degree, born in France and a French citizen—was typical. She
explains (after my question regarding situations where racism was the most
influential):
At work, especially when you apply for a job. At job interviews, I would always be
asked where I was from. I am French, but to them, it doesn’t appear that way
(interview Rouen, 26 February 2007).

On average, the black French citizens I interviewed in 2007, all of whom
held university degrees and were French citizens, took about three years to
finally find a job. In most cases, they found jobs that did not meet their
expectations—a finding confirmed by more-systematic research (Simon
2003).
The French state thus demands or at least tolerates the fact that job
applicants need to give evidence of their skin colour when applying for work,
fully aware that this will significantly (and probably negatively) impact on
their chances. In other words, French political elites and the state they
command are aware that traditional white French citizens routinely
discriminate against non-whites and non-Christians, a conclusion that is
further evidenced by the long history of half-hearted and thus ineffective
measures taken by the state to at least formally address this issue (Kiwan
2007). But those same elites avoid taking any concrete and effective action
to counteract this situation with reference to the ideal of universalism,
laïcism and republicanism, although all of these ideals were formulated
precisely to ensure equality, brotherhood and liberty. So why have political
elites in France not acted more decisively to ensure the quality of their
democracy and the upholding of the high principles it represents? The most
plausible answer, it appears, is that they do not want to. Prohibiting the
excluded from using cultural, ethnic and religious criteria to address
inequalities while, at the same time, allowing employers to use ethnic criteria
in their hiring practices, reveals the deep bias with which political elites
address this issue. The conclusion reached by Louis-Georges Tin, black
activist and founder of Cran, an umbrella organisation for black associations
in France, seems the most plausible:
I must note that the fierce adversaries of communities, as a matter of fact, were not
against communities as such; they were against some communities: Arab-Muslims,
Jews, and homosexuals […] no one criticizes the sixteenth arrondissement in Paris, a
bourgeois community which also has its particular habits, mores, and customs. No
one would dream of criticizing the traditional communities, professional communities,
and the Catholic communities (Tin 2008: 38).
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French political elites know about the discriminatory practices that
victimise a part of the French citizenry yet they do not act decisively to
resolve them. Instead, they hold on to the rhetoric of universalism, even
though its aim is also to ensure equal rights for all. French citizenship has,
as a consequence of persistent discrimination, become racialised and
divided. Whereas traditional white citizens insist on their citizenship rights,
thus treating them as assets and entitlements, ethnicised non-traditional
minorities have become second-class citizens who are not allowed to
experience the full extent of their role. To them, citizenship is not a set of
entitlements but an unfulfilled promise.
It is not surprising that people seek to defend privilege, especially if
unmerited, and when it promises to secure concrete and very important
advantages—for example, on a very competitive job market. It is, however,
the responsibility of political elites and state apparatuses to check these
tendencies and enact policies that aim to ensure equal opportunities—the
core of the universalist idea. Instead, French political elites are assisting
white citizens to defend their racial privileges, thus revealing profound
double standards. If the French state is so sternly against any form of
particularism, then the ethnic marking of applicants on their curricula vitae
should be illegal, especially considering its highly consequential effects on
(universalist) equal opportunities. Racist bias in hiring would also have to be
addressed in other ways in order to ensure equal chances, for example by
enacting quotas. Furthermore, if state elites were really committed to
achieving universal equality, they would not rob those negatively affected by
discriminatory practices of the means to address them. They do this by not
allowing a diagnosis of the current situation of the French citizenry—that
takes account of inequalities—in the form of colour-conscious censuses.
French political elites, however, have not done anything to effectively
counteract the racist practices of traditional white citizens. This reluctance
can only be explained by remembering the benefits that political elites and
their electorate reap from the current situation: it provides the white majority
with a competitive advantage on the job market, allows state elites to escape
scrutiny and shields them from being held responsible for the wide array of
social problems facing French society by blaming Others.
Portugal: Others into Foreigners
Portuguese society is increasingly heterogeneous, although there are no data on
how heterogeneous its population truly is, as the Portuguese state follows the
French model of not differentiating between its citizens. However, cities such as
Lisbon count on a significant population of non-white citizens who go to school
with, and compete for jobs against, the dominant white population. After
examining the role of state elites in the creation and maintenance of a racist
common sense that leads to racialised conceptions of first- and second-class
citizenship, the case of Portugal allows us to shed light on the implication of
academia in this maintenance which frames non-whites as foreigners and
immigrants, while deciding who ‘fits in’ based on ethnic background. I present two
arguments here to elucidate this phenomenon: first, the fact that there are almost
no studies on blacks in Portugal, despite their visibility in cities like Lisbon and
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Porto; and second, the fact that some immigrants—those labelled ‘home-comers’
or retornados—are much more welcome and taken care of than others, an
attribute with strong racial undertones.
The literature about blacks in Portugal or on the situation of minorities there is
scarce, and there are almost no publications on the topic.4 Instead, it is very
common to read that ‘Portugal is a fundamentally homogeneous country in terms
of ethnicity and language, and also as regards religious faith’ (Freire 2007: 208).
This goes against all the empirical evidence from Lisbon when we know from
research that ‘legally settled foreigners represent around 5 per cent of the
resident population’ (Marques et al. 2007: 1149). Furthermore, research on
education by these same authors who, in 2004, conducted a case study in the
municipality of Oeiras, Greater Lisbon, allows us to deduce the degree of
heterogeneity that characterises contemporary Lisbon society. Marques et al.
found that, among their sample of Oeiras schoolchildren aged 14 to 24, ‘44.3 per
cent [were] […] children of immigrants’ (2007: 1156). At the same time, articles
and books about immigrants abound, thus creating the false impression that
Portugal has indeed an immigration problem, but not a problem of ensuring equal
opportunities to its diverse citizenry.
So what kind of scholarly blindness allows social scientists to state that
Portugal is a fundamentally homogeneous country? It appears that the lack of
statistics on the presence and situation of minorities among the Portuguese
citizenry has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. By focusing academic production
on foreigners and immigrants while, at the same time, not producing any
information on the number of minorities, let alone on their socio-economic
situation, Portuguese scholars help to perpetuate a common sense that says
‘Portuguese citizens are white; non-whites are foreigners and immigrants’. Similar
to the French case, the interest behind such manoeuvering is quite evident: real
problems remain unexamined and important questions unaddressed; political
elites escape scrutiny by shifting the blame onto others, which allows them to
continue in their malpractices; whites, perceived as ‘normal citizens’, benefit from
the bedeviling of non-whites and reap tangible benefits.
In the case of Portugal, where funding for scholarly work in the social sciences
is scarce and almost 100 per cent comes directly from different state agencies or
from the state-owned Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT), it becomes
clear that intellectual elites depend on state elites for the funding of their research
projects (http://alfa.fct.mctes.pt/estatisticas/global). The fact that there are so few
studies on ethnic minorities, especially blacks, in Portugal thus cannot be
interpreted as a coincidence. To the contrary, the only two possible explanations
for this omission are that (a) the state does not fund such studies, or (b) that
Portuguese researchers do not propose any projects about Portuguese ethnic
diversity in relation to equal opportunities and questions of justice. Both
possibilities seem plausible and deserve further scrutiny. For the sake of my
study, it is enough to point to the inherent conservativism and inertia of scientific
research programmes, favoring research projects that are within already
established paradigms. This tendency complicates the emergence of new
research projects that are unconnected to already-established truths and the
methods, units of analyses, and research questions associated with them (Kuhn
1996; Popper 2002). Scholars thus share in the responsibility of perpetuating the
invisibility of ethnic minorities in Portuguese society—which, in turn, contributes

B. Reiter

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies

to the perpetuation of their situation of exclusion and second-class citizenship
status.
According to the extremely scarce information available, second-generation
immigrants (a doubtful denomination in itself), fare much worse in school
compared to their white counterparts. Marques et al. found that ‘Africans have
gained the status of “the most visible minority”. Surveys show that they are more
prone to be perceived as immigrants than any other category […] They are still
the least welcome in close family relations’. They also found that ‘nearly three
quarters of students with Cape Verdean ancestry experienced grade blockage at
least once’ (Marques et al. 2007: 1149, 1160). In other words, 75 per cent of 14–
24-year-old students in Oeiras with a Cape Verdean background repeat a year at
least once before they graduate from High School!
‘In Oeiras, we found that around a third of the Portuguese students have to
repeat a school year at least once, compared to 41 per cent for native-born
children of immigrant parentage and 51 per cent for the foreign-born’ (Marques et
al. 2007: 1158). There are also extreme differences among ‘native-born children
of immigrant parentage’ and those born to traditional Portuguese residents with
regard to early school determination, despite the fact that the majority of
Portuguese students (77 per cent, according to Marques et al. 2007) aspire to
attend university. Hortas (2008) confirms these findings, at least indirectly, when
stating that ‘When we look at immigrant dropout/failure, we see that the rates are
triple the norm in primary school, and double for the other cycles’ (2008: 423).
The use of such extremely cumbersome designations as ‘native-born children
of immigrant parentage’ hints at the difficulties that Portuguese scholars face
when discussing this issue. When reading through the available educational
statistics and the research conducted in this field, it appears that what
schoolchildren who face above average dropout and repetition rates indeed
share is not their legal status but the colour of their skin. They are all non-white
and, even though Portuguese is their first language, they perform significantly
worse than their white Portuguese colleagues and even white EU immigrants
(Marques et al. 2007). In other words white foreigners, whose first language is
not Portuguese, by far outperform black Portuguese schoolchildren whose first
language is Portuguese.
The relative absence of studies about the socio-economic situation of
Portuguese minorities, especially blacks, and the cumbersome treatment and
reluctance with which they are treated together with the high profile of studies
that focus on immigrants, all help to consolidate the already wide-spread
common sense that transforms black Portuguese citizens into foreigners. The
statement of an interviewee illustrates this state of affairs:
I am a Portuguese citizen but at the same time I am not a Portuguese citizen. I have all the
rights, but at the same time, I have none. I have even represented Portugal at international
events, while I was a student. But because of my colour, I am not treated as a citizen. I
constantly experience discrimination at all levels: social, cultural, economic … I compete in
5
the job market against Portuguese classmates who had worse grades, but they get the job.

Who counts as a national and who does not thus has severe consequences on
life-chances in both France and Portugal—no matter the citizenship status.
“Nationals must be white”—informs the common sense—a common sense that
obfuscates all the inequalities and injustices to which non-white citizens are
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routinely exposed, while at the same time securing privileges to white citizens,
and relieving political elites of their responsibility to ensure justice and equality
among their citizenry—the cornerstones of democracy. After all, ‘Blacks do not
belong here’ and, perceived as foreigners, are not a concern of political elites and
the white majorities they represent.
Ties to the Motherland: Of Remittances and Returners
A final piece of empirical evidence of the construction of extremely biased racial
regimes in Portugal is provided by the curious case of the so-called ‘homecomers’ or retornados—white African immigrants who settled in Portugal mostly
between 1974 and 1975. When Portugal’s African colonies achieved
independence in 1974, many white colonisers ran the risk of losing their
privileges and maybe even their properties and lives, and some 800,000 decided
to move to Portugal. These white home-comers encountered such a welcoming
and open Portugal that the whole experience was widely praised as a ‘great
success story’ of integration (e.g. by Pires 2003). The willingness of the
Portuguese society and state to accommodate these immigrants went so far as to
alter a long-established legal tradition—the naturalisation law—which, since 1981
and in order to accommodate the returning colonisers now gone astray, was
changed from jus soli to jus sanguini. After the changes of 1981, a child born to a
Portuguese parent automatically becomes a Portuguese citizen, provided the
parent was born in Portugal or in a territory administered by the Portuguese
state.6
Since 1981, Portugal thus welcomes all those able to claim Portuguese
ancestry while, at the same time, blocking the integration of all those without it.
Through this manoeuvre, returners were not considered as immigrants. The
success of this re-integration, according to Pinheiro, was due to the fact that ‘this
biographical particularity of this community is not visible in Portuguese society’
(Pinheiro 2008: 66). Read: They were white. Pinheiro continues: ‘With the
retornados also came approximately 28,000 Africans, both refugees from the civil
wars in Angola and Mozambique and working immigrants from all former
colonies. Unlike the retornados, this African community had no special
connection to Portugal or Portuguese nationality since they came from
independent states’ (2008: 67)—no connection other than having worked for the
Portuguese colonial empire and, as a consequence of betting on the wrong side,
having lost a home in the newly independent African states, one might add.
Indeed, a significant number of this early group of Africans most probably held
Portuguese passports, because they had worked on the side of the colonisers,
helping to control and administer the ‘natives’, a fact that can easily be verified by
interviewing this population. Indeed, as Marques et al. (2007) indicate, some of
these ‘returners’ have lived in Africa for generations. The maintenance of cultural
ties to the colonial motherland has proved extremely consequential to them so
that, in contemporary Portugal, the divisions created under colonial rule between
colonial subjects and colonisers still plague intra- and inter-ethnic relations
(Reiter 2008). It also seems legitimate to deduce that the dual labour market that
determines the opportunities available to African migrants and their descendents,
diagnosed by Eaton (2001), can in part be explained by the relation of different
African-descent groups to the Portuguese colonial state. In an interview
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conducted in 2003, the president of the Lisbon-based Cape Verdean association,
Ms. Alestina Tolentino, explained:
After independence, many Cape Verdeans settled in Portugal. They were Cape Verdean
nationals, but they had worked for the Portuguese state in Cape Verde. As such, they had
acquired certain rights, pensions, social security, and such, which they had because they
were Portuguese citizens. So when all these returners arrived in Portugal after
independence, among them were many Cape Verdeans. They were highly qualified
because they had worked for the Portuguese colonial apparatus […] The face of colonialism
for many Angolans and Mozambicans was not Portuguese, but Cape Verdean.

Most returners moved to Portugal because of the links they had forged during
colonial times, when they had a direct connection to the colonising state
apparatus. Once in Portugal, they could count on pensions and social security
schemes. They felt, and most of them also officially were, Portuguese citizens
and all those who were not would become so after 1981. If they were Cape
Verdean nationals, they would still fit the racial regime that was created during
colonial times and then employed to construct social hierarchies in Portugal, as
most Cape Verdeans are easily distinguishable from Angolans and Mozambicans
by their lighter skin colour.
As Reiter (2008: 403), explains:
Under the indigenous law code that regulated life in most of the Portuguese world until 1961,
some natives could become Portuguese citizens if they passed the ‘civilization-test’,
consisting of demonstrating their degree of assimilation to European values and manners.
The Indigenous Code of 1954 regulated the stages that led from being ‘indigenous’ to
becoming ‘civilized’, making the achievement of European manners and habits the
benchmark for gaining access to Portuguese citizenship rights. Assimilated Portuguese
citizens had to demonstrate that they had left their ‘native savagery’ behind. Successful
assimilation had to be proven through Portuguese language skills, clothing style, food
habits, and other western civilized manners.

After 1974, Portuguese state elites thus ‘took care of theirs’ and, in so doing,
made sure that uncivilised Others could not slip in.
However, the maintenance of bonds with individuals and groups who have
connections to the motherland is a not uncomplicated matter, especially for
Portugal, a country that had long argued its intimate closeness to its colonial
subjects. Portuguese settlements in Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau,
Goa, Macao, South Africa and Cape Verde reach back to the sixteenth century.
The Portuguese presence never effectively ended with independence, so that
most of the former colonies still have a sizeable Portuguese population. By the
late 1990s, the economic boom that was caused by Portugal joining the EU and
receiving millions of EU funds to improve infrastructure started to slow down and
unemployment began to rise. During that time the first studies about remittances
emerged. From the late 1990s onward, remittances declined steadily from 3 per
cent of GNP in 1990 to 2.5 per cent by the end of the decade.7
While colonial ties seemed to presume that Portugal would take care of all
those who had helped to sustain the colonial apparatus by facilitating their
integration into the Portuguese state, it became clear by the late 1990s that
Portugal could not welcome all those communities that upheld their Portuguese
nationality. Under these new economic circumstances, and equipped with hard
evidence about the magnitude and importance of remittances for the Portuguese
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economy, Portuguese political elites shifted gear. They realised that it was no
longer desirable to ‘bring home’ all the former colonisers or those who had
passed the ‘civilisation test’ and could count on national solidarity, based on their
white skin or their white habits. While it still seemed important to maintain the
bonds that united these exiled communities to the motherland—the sine-qua-non
conduction to ensure that remittances continued to flow ‘home’—it also seemed
important to ensure that these exiles stayed where they were, rather than further
burdening the Portuguese labour market.
Political elites found the solution to these new challenges of the late 1990s in
the Camões Institute. Since 2000, new Camões Cultural Centers were
established in Paris and in Poitiers (France), Dakar (Senegal), Windhoek
(Namibia), Dili (East Timor), Hamburg (Germany), Stockholm (Sweden)
andVienna (Austria), as well as in the headquarters of the African Union in Addis
Ababa (Ethiopia) and of the Economic Community of West African States in
Abuja (Nigeria). Portuguese Language Centers were opened in Canchungo,
Ongoré, Mansoa, Bafatá, Gabú, Buba, Catió, Bolama, Bubaque, and Quinhamel,
all in Guinea Bissau, to spread the use of Portuguese as the official language in
the country. Taken together, since 1998 the Portuguese state has opened 19
language centres and is now present in 20 cities in different countries. According
to Malheiros (2002), ‘Portugal's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has registered and
attempts to maintain ties with nearly 4.3 million Portuguese and people with
Portuguese ancestry living abroad’.8 In 2007, the Camões Institute, together with
the Lisbon-based Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e Empresa (ISCTE)
determined that the Portuguese language contributed 17 per cent to the
Portuguese GDP.9
Portuguese political elites have thus found a way to categorise their citizens
into those who can live in Portugal and those who are more functional if and
when they stay abroad but send their money home to their families. Neither are
all passport-holders welcome in the motherland—as the situation of all those who
hold passports, but are treated as foreigners, demonstrates. Conversely, others
have been received with open arms, and laws have been changed to
accommodate them. The racial project that informs this categorising of people
and groups into ‘desirable’ and ‘less-desirable’ is hard to overlook. Yet most
Portuguese scholars do just that—be it because they cannot find funding for
projects that would raise these issues, or because they are too caught up in a
hegemonic common sense that has long accepted that non-whites are not
Portuguese and thus cannot count on the solidarity of the national community. In
so doing, Portuguese academia becomes implicated in the reproduction of a
racialised common sense that legitimises the maintenance of a racialised social
order, dividing the Portuguese citizenry into first- and second-class citizens.
Whereas the white (biological or culturally defined) first-class citizens can count
on citizenship rights as entitlements, second-class citizens have not been allowed
to live the lives of citizens. The ‘asset’ nature of citizenship becomes evident, as
all those benefiting from such a system have no reason to change it—and
instead have every reason to hold the ‘Others’ out.
Conclusion: Framing Non-Whites and Producing Second-Class Citizens
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An ethnically defined nationalism has become the norm in Western Europe.
Although its emergence can be explained by the late-state formation of some EU
member-states, such as Germany (Hobsbawm 2003), other states—such as
France or Portugal—have only recently shifted away from (in the case of
Portugal) or restricted the reach of (in the case of France) the jus soli rules that
have long been a cornerstone of their democracies. The contemporary strength
of ethnic nationalism must thus be seen as the result of deliberate political action
aimed at redrawing the rules of belonging.
Ethnic nationalism, however, not only perpetuates the exclusion of non-whites
by defining them as not belonging to the national community; it also stands in the
way of the country achieving truly universal citizenship and democracy with
strong civil, political and social components. The persistence and even growth of
ethnic nationalism is the root of many of the problems which Europe faces today,
because it competes with the development of civic bonds among an increasingly
heterogeneous European citizenry.
A complication to this problem is caused by the commonly almost exclusive
focus on citizenship rights, to the detriment of citizenship duties and
responsibilities. Ethnically defined nationalism, coupled with a widely held belief
that citizenship is a matter of rights without responsibilities and duties, has
created a situation where ethnic white Europeans arrogantly insist on their ‘rights’
as citizens—thus presenting them as entitlements while conveniently overlooking
their responsibilities towards their fellow citizens. Instead, minority citizens get
routinely blamed for every and all the economic, social and political problems that
many European countries have experienced over the last decades.
The lack of a focus on civic solidarity and of a civically defined European
membership is also at the core, I would contend, of the oft-times awkward
difficulties many European states and societies have when dealing with antidemocratic elements in their midst. Instead of focusing on anti-democratic agents
as the prime culprits of terror and insecurity, blame is commonly shifted away
from civic matters towards cultural and ethnic ones—thus unduly blaming certain
religions, cultures and ethnic groups for violent acts and ‘tendencies’, thus further
perpetuating stereotypes about others.
To make matters worse, several European states do not provide census data
on the ethnic backgrounds of their citizens, justifying such a policy with reference
to the principle of universal citizenship. Minority citizens thus have no way of
knowing their numbers, situation or degree to which they have a shared destiny.
By most accounts, having access to these numbers could prove explosive and is
thus avoided by status-quo-oriented political elites. Parallel to not providing
census information on European minorities, several European states actively
fund a plethora of studies that focus exclusively on immigrants, thus anchoring
public attention and discourse firmly on issues of foreigners and their problems of
attaining legality and achieving integration. Academia has become implicated in
the dissemination of a framework that almost automatically transforms all nonwhites into foreigners and immigrants. There is a clear lack of studies on an
increasingly diverse European citizenry and the difficulties of non-white citizens in
gaining acceptance, equal opportunities and equal treatment by the state and
other—white—citizens. They have become second-class citizens who are not
allowed to experience the full extent of the social role that comes with the status
of being a citizen.
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Broadly accepted racist practices support the marginalisation of non-white
European citizens and expose them to discriminatory practices, and policies, the
unchallenged reproduction of which provides evidence for the high degree to
which such discrimination has been normalised. Extremely unjust racial regimes
are thus being constructed and their victims are being robbed of the tools with
which to face up to them effectively.
The influence of European racial regimes becomes even more evident when
considering how some migrants, namely ethnic whites, have been able to
successfully escape the status of victims. Post-1974 white African immigrants to
Portugal have successfully claimed the status of ‘returners’, which has allowed
them to settle unproblematically in Portugal. In 1981 the Portuguese national
assembly effectively passed a law restricting Portuguese citizenship to those of
Portuguese descent—therefore shifting citizenship criteria from jus soli to jus
sanguinis—in order to accommodate white ‘returners’ and facilitate their
integration. But what criterion, if not ethnicity, makes one a ‘returner’?
Ethnic nationalism thus is at the core of many problems of contemporary
European states and societies. Instead of blaming immigrants, EU memberstates ought to make democracy its foundational element, and membership
dependent on citizens’ willingness to actively support and defend democracy,
which would imply a stronger focus on citizenship responsibilities. But political
elites have successfully shifted the focus onto migrants and foreigners and made
them the culprits of most of the social problems which European societies face
today, allowing those same elites to avoid being blamed for the problems for
which they are ultimately responsible. Scholars who, in their studies, focus
excessively on immigrants and foreigners, further contribute to a hegemonic
common sense that transforms non-whites into foreigners and intruders, thus
supporting political elites in their manoeuvring and providing them with legitimacy.
If anything, social scientists should produce more studies on failing and
unresponsive states, inefficient bureaucracies, and the dearth of democratic
institutions. They should also unveil more of the injustices and problems that a
significant part of the European citizenry routinely faces. If they were to do so, we
might be able to improve the current situation and work towards more just and
inclusive democracies, which might also prove more economically efficient—at
least if we believe the Nobel-price winning economist Amartya Sen (2000).
Notes
[1]

It seems important to explain that my own interest in citizenship does not
take issue with a whole set of arguments about what rights are and whether
or not social reality can be influenced by such lofty concepts as citizenship
rights or social rights. I am sceptical about the potential of laws to produce
reality and aware of the pitfalls of legal idealism. Citizenship, here, thus
does not refer to a set of entitlements. This article is instead concerned with
the quality and the conditionalities that restrict the political, civil and social
rights of certain individuals and groups within a citizenry. More precisely, I
want to analyse how societal dynamics affect and condition the quality of
citizenship. Marshall’s (1992[1950]) essay had a narrower interest—to
analyse the relationship between citizenship and capitalism. He was thus
able to see, that ‘the components of a civilized and cultured life, formerly
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[2]
[3]
[4]

[5]
[6]

[7]
[8]
[9]
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the monopoly of the few, were brought progressively within reach of the
many, who were encouraged thereby to stretch out their hands towards
those that still eluded their grasp. The diminution of inequality strengthened
the demand for its abolition, at least with regard to the essentials of social
welfare’(1992 [1950]: 37).
Quoted in John Thornhill, Financial Times, 8 November 2005.
TNS
SOFRES
(2007),
survey
results
available
online
at
http://lecran.org/?p=243.
A search in what is probably the most prestigious academic social-science
journal published in Portugal, Analise Social, revealed that, between 2000
and 2009, the journal published 20 articles focusing on migration, but only
one on ethnic minorities. Published in 2005, Machado et al. analyse the
effects of cultural differences on school performance. Notable exceptions to
this tendency of Portuguese academia to render minorities invisible include
the work of Fradique (2003), Contador (2001) and Marques et al. (2007).
Interview (my translation) conducted on 10 June 2003 in Lisbon (see Reiter
2008: 409 for complete quote).
Article 1, which specifies original nationality, states that Portuguese by
descent are all those born to a Portuguese mother or father in Portuguese
territory or in a foreign country if the progenitor was living there and working
for the Portuguese state as well as all those born in Portuguese territory or
living there over 6 years and working for the Portuguese state who want to
adopt Portuguese nationality. ARTIGO 1.º(Nacionalidade originária): 1—
São Portugueses de origem: a) Os filhos de pai português ou mãe
portuguesa nascidos em território português ou sob administração
portuguesa, ou no estrangeiro se o progenitor português aí se encontrar ao
serviço do Estado Português; b) Os filhos de pai português ou mãe
portuguesa nascidos no estrangeiro se declararem que querem ser
portugueses ou inscreverem o nascimento no registo civil português; c) Os
indivíduos nascidos em território português filhos de estrangeiros que aqui
residam habitualmente há, pelo menos, seis anos não estejam ao serviço
do respectivo Estado, se declararem que querem ser portugueses; d) Os
indivíduos nascidos em território português quando não possuam outra
nacionalidade. 2—Presumem-se nascidos em território português ou sob
administração portuguesa, salvo prova em contrário, os recém-nascidos
expostos naqueles territories.
Banco de Portugal (2006) Remittances in the Portuguese Balance of
Payments. Luxembourg Group on Remittances, 26–7 June, online:
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/bop/2006/luxgrp/pdf/italy.pdf.
MPI: http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=77.
Jornal Publico, 21 January 2009.
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